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1B1BThis paper investigates the problem of sustaining economic growth, viewed from the perspective 
of how growth is affected by government policy choices as well as by the nature of government.  Special 
attention is given to the role of rent seeking in limiting growth.  Three types of economic growth are 
identified from the standpoint of the sources of growth, and each type is identified with an element of the 
aggregate production function.  While any of the three types may persist for a time under the right 
circumstances, it is argued that only one of these can be permanently sustained.  Sector-specific 
interventionist policies that speed up either of the other two types of growth will slow down the type of 
growth that can be permanently sustained and are therefore likely to lead to a period of slow growth or 
stagnation following a period of rapid growth.  Finally, it is argued that building strong democratic 
institutions is the best and most basic way to guarantee the type of growth that can be sustained 
permanently. 
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2B2BON SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
                                                                           
 
Introduction: the Aggregate Production Function. 
 
 
This paper investigates the problem of sustaining economic growth, viewed from the perspective of 
how growth is affected by government policy choices as well as by the nature of government.  Special 
attention is given to the role of rent seeking in limiting growth.  Since the seminal paper by Solow [1957], 
economists have often examined growth through the prism of an aggregate production function.  In Parente 
and Prescott [2004], this is a Cobb-Douglas, constant-returns-to-scale function with Hicks-neutral 
technological change, which they claim provides a good empirical fit to the growth experiences of many 
different nations.  Consequently, we shall use this form, adapting it to our purposes.  It can be written: 
Y = EA(K

)(N
1 – 
),                                                                        (1). 
where Y is aggregate output or value added in an economy, K is capital, N is labor, A indexes the world’s 
stock of technical knowledge, E indexes the efficiency with which the economy uses this knowledge, and  is 
the share of capital in Y.  Here  includes not only the share of physical capital, but also that of human and 
intangible forms of capital, such as the ―trust‖ or ―social‖ capital introduced below.  EA is the economy’s total 
factor productivity (hereafter TFP).  Given Hicks-neutral technology, technological progress (increases in 
TFP) magnifies output without affecting the marginal rate of substitution between K and N at any K/N. 
The values of  and A above are assumed to be common across all economies at any point in time—
with  believed to be on the order of two-thirds—whereas K, N, and E vary from one economy to another, 
with E lying between zero and one.  When E is close to one, the policies and institutions of the economy in 
question enable it to make the best possible use of the world’s stock of technical knowledge.  When E is well 
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below one, the economy is making less than optimal use of this knowledge.  All forms of inefficiency show 
up through their impacts on E, which is therefore a general index of an economy’s efficiency. 
However, the main reason for E to lie below one, according to Parente and Prescott, is that the policies 
and institutions of the economy in question are restricting its producers’ choices of technology, either directly 
or by distorting incentives.  The effect of this is similar to forcing an economy inside its production-
possibilities frontier.  Such restrictions are maintained in order to protect rents earned by some inputs, which 
would be vulnerable to increased competitive pressures, were the restrictions to be relaxed.  The inputs in 
question are specialized to existing technologies, and their owners may be able to exercise control over 
supply.  Since A is rising over time, a restriction that freezes technology in an economy will cause E to fall, as 
the existing technology becomes more and more backward relative to best choices available.  Thus E 
measures efficiency in any economy, relative to best practices.      
Using (1), Parente and Prescott argue that differences in GDP per capita, both over time and across 
nations at any given point in time, result largely from differences in TFP.  Differences at any given point in 
time result mainly from differences in E from one country to another, reflecting incentive differences and 
different restrictions on producers’ choices of technology.  Growth ―miracles‖ occur when changes in policies 
and institutions cause a rapid increase in E, as via the economic reforms in China and Vietnam.  The ideal 
outcome is when E remains close to one, allowing an economy to fully benefit from increases in A and from 
the capital deepening under competitive conditions to which these increases give rise, on which more below.  
A virtue of ―free trade clubs‖—basically common markets (such as the EU or NAFTA) whose 
member states have enough sovereignty to choose their own production technologies—is that they tend to 
erode constraints that keep E down.  Restrictions that hold in one member nation of such a club but not in 
all—such as work rules that raise production costs—are vulnerable to competitive pressures that originate in a 
member without these restrictions.  By expanding the market, these clubs also raise the elasticity of demand 
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facing any domestic industry producing tradable products.  As a result, if this industry abandons or is freed 
from restrictions that were increasing its costs or reducing its quality, it can hope to be rewarded with more 
income when it cuts prices or improves quality. 
 In fact, there is evidence to suggest that sustained economic growth resulting in sustained 
improvements in living standards is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating from the 18
th
 century.  In his 
famous treatise, Kuznets [1966] called this ―modern economic growth (or MEG).‖  Technological progress 
dates well back into pre-history, but before 1700, this tended to result in population growth rather than in 
sustained living standard increases.  Parente and Prescott argue that the classical theory of Malthus [1965] and 
Ricardo [1951] goes a long way toward explaining this.  To invoke it, we need a ―traditional‖ production 
function that differs somewhat from (1), taking the form:    
YT = AT(KT)

(NT)
LT)
(1 –  – )
,                                                                (2). 
where the T-subscript denotes traditional production and L is land or possibly another factor of production 
which is scarce and whose supply cannot be increased.  Also  is capital’s share of output,  is labor’s share, 
(1 –  – ) is the share of land under constant returns to scale, and AT is total factor productivity.   
In the traditional economy, increases in TFP are assumed to lead to increases in per-capita 
consumption, which lead in turn to population growth and thus to increases in NT.  Against the fixed 
endowment of land, increases in NT and in KT give rise to diminishing returns, and there is then a trade-off 
between population growth and increases in living standards.  In Malthus and Ricardo, population continues 
to expand until most members of society are reduced to subsistence, but as Parente and Prescott point out, this 
was clearly not the case in many places and times prior to 1700.  In their scenario, social policies and 
institutions determine the population and living standards of any given society, which tries to set the highest 
living standard that is sustainable.  If it sets a a living standard that is too high—and thus a population-to-land 
ratio that is too low—it will be unable to defend its territory.  Some or all of its land will be expropriated, and 
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its living standard will fall.  For the world as a whole, however, a social control over population was lacking, 
since some societies used emigration as a way to keep their own populations from growing too large, and 
migrating hunter-gatherer societies would sometimes split up when they got too large.   
Given the formulation in (2), when will a society switch from traditional to modern economic growth?  
Plausibly, this will happen when the return on investment using the ―modern‖ production function (1) exceeds 
that from the traditional function (2), taking into account the protection of rents that underlies the efficiency 
coefficient, E.  Because E varies from economy to economy, the transition to modern growth could happen at 
quite different times in different countries, as it clearly did.  Latecomers to industrialization may then catch up 
to the original leaders or fail to do this, depending on whether policy changes occur that raise E. 
Parente and Prescott’s formulation of traditional production is ingenious, but some economic 
historians will have issues with it.  In many times and places prior to 1700, land does not appear to have been 
a scarce factor of production (eg., North and Thomas [1973, 1977]; Domar [1970]).  Prior to the Neolithic 
Revolution, which transformed hunter-gatherer societies into economies based on agriculture, the populations 
of wild animals and plants would best serve as the third factor of production.  These were not initially scarce, 
but owing to a combination of population growth, technological improvements in hunting, and consequent 
decreases in the stocks of animals and plants, they became so prior to the Neolithic Revolution.  The resulting 
diminishing returns and falling living standards motivated the switch to agriculture [North and Thomas 1977].  
Similarly, an explanation of human bondage is that it was a way to keep down labor’s share of income and 
output in conditions in which labor rather than land was the scarce factor of production [Domar 1970; North 
and Thomas 1973, ch. 3].  However, population growth eventually made labor more plentiful and helped to 
bring bondage to an end, since competition among workers for jobs then held down the earnings of labor. 
Finally, one can ask why the ―traditional‖ production function is for traditional economies only.  
Modern economies rely heavily on non-renewable resources, whose supplies are limited.  Equation (1) and the 
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parameter values used by Parente and Prescott imply higher levels of long-term growth than are observed, as 
we shall see.  Thus removing the resource constraint from the modern production function may be premature.  
Nevertheless, the scope and coverage of Parente and Prescott’s work are impressive.1  
 
5B5BTypes of Economic Growth and Limits to Growth 
 
Next we adapt the aggregate production function in (1) to our own ends.  To begin with, we 
distinguish three types of economic growth, in place of the usual two.  Extensive growth is defined as 
growth of output or value added owing to increases in inputs, with technology held constant, while 
intensive growth is growth of output or value added owing to technological progress, with inputs held 
constant.  In (1), this is also growth of TFP or of EA, whereas extensive growth is growth with constant 
EA, implying that E is falling at the same percentage rate that A is rising—estimated by Parente and 
Prescottt to be about 2% per year.  In addition, we can divide intensive growth into growth based on 
increases in E, with A constant, and growth based on increases in A, with E constant.   
This gives three basic types of economic growth: (a). extensive; (b). intensive and based on 
raising E—in particular, on catching up technologically by importing technology with a history of use 
abroad; (c). intensive and based on increases in A—that is, on domestic innovation and sharing of new 
technology developed abroad.  An economy passes from (a) to (b) and/or (c) when most economic 
growth is accounted for by broadly-defined technological progress rather than by quantity increases in 
the factors of production, mainly capital.  It passes from (b) to (c) as it relies more and more on domestic 
innovation and sharing of new technology to generate growth, rather than on technology catch-up.  One 
indication of this is likely to be a rising ratio of exports to imports in technology trade.  The usual two-
way classification [eg., Eichengreen 2007] lumps (a) and (b) together by defining ―extensive‖ growth as 
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growth with given A—that is, as growth with given technological knowledge worldwide.  However, the 
limits to growth are different in the case of (a) than in the case of (b), and this is why we separate them. 
We can rewrite equation (1) as y = EAk

, where y = Y/N is output per unit of labor and k = K/N is 
capital per unit of labor.  In terms of growth rates, we have: 
y
g
 = E
g
 + A
g
 + kg,                                                                           (3). 
if we ignore second-order effects, where the g superscript denotes rate of growth—ie., yg = dy/y, where 
dy is the first-order change in y over a given time period.  E
g
 and A
g
 are the growth rates of E and A, and 
kg is the rate of extensive growth.  Thus yg is the sum of types (a), (b), and (c) growth rates of y, 
although as will be shown, this conceals a key complementarity between extensive and intensive growth.   
Since E is the crucial parameter in (1), we next set out its key arguments.  Let AD denote the 
domestic level of technology and D index the severity of domestic barriers to the movement of capital 
and labor between sectors.  These include exit as well as entry barriers and therefore subsidies that 
impede mobility, as well as legal prohibitions and geographical constraints, etc.  Also let ID be a vector 
denoting the costs of various types of information relevant to the performance of an economy.  These 
include information about prices and about new technologies, about the nature of products being bought 
and sold, the past behavior of buyers and sellers, etc.  Whereas D indexes the cost of moving labor and 
capital, ID indexes the costs of acquiring another key resource, namely information. 
Since E indexes relative efficiency, we then write: 
E = E(k, D/, AD/A, ID/I, Ps),                                                                  (4). 
with , A, and I denoting the values of these variables in ―best-practice‖ economies where E is set equal 
to one.  In particular, A gives the level of technology in such an economy, as in the preceding section.  
Generally, E is increasing in AD/A and decreasing in D/ and ID/I, although not always.  For example, a 
degree of secrecy about new products under development often helps to encourage entrepreneurship. 
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Entry of k into the right-hand side of (4) relates to destructive rent seeking, or the use of 
resources to redistribute wealth without increasing it.  Rent seeking eventually becomes a growing 
problem as k increases, with no change in AD, because the return on investment or marginal product of k 
is decreasing in k, and using resources to seek rent is an alternative to using them for productive 
investment.  Let e
R
 be the share of Y lost to destructive rent seeking.  That is, if all resources used to 
redistribute wealth were used instead to produce output, y would rise by e
R
y, which is therefore the 
direct cost of rent seeking.  Let E
R
 = (1 + e
R
) and y
G
 = E
R
y = E
R
EA(k

) = E
G
A(k

) be y gross of direct 
rent-seeking cost, where E
G
 is efficiency measured without subtracting this cost—or the efficiency that 
would prevail if the direct cost of rent seeking were zero.  As such, E
G
 is independent of k, and E = 
E
G
/E
R
, which gives E
g
 = (E
G
)
g
 – (ER)g.  Thus E can fall over time if rent seeking (ER) is increasing.  The 
marginal product of k, yk, is then given by: 
yk = (EA)/k
(1)
 + (EkAk
y/kEk/E)y = y/k(E
G
E
R
k)/E(E
R
)
2
]y,                       (5). 
where Ek is the change in E and E
R
k is the change in E
R
 caused by a unit increase in k.   
Starting from a point where the returns on productive investment (yk) and on investment in rent 
seeking are equal, suppose k increases by a unit.  If rent seeking (E
R
) remains constant, the return on 
productive investment will fall below the return on rent seeking, and resources will be moved from 
creating wealth into efforts to redistribute, which is to say that E
R
 will rise and therefore E will fall.  
Since E
R
 is increasing and E is decreasing in k, yk can be negative, although never when Ek = 0 (or is 
small enough to ignore).  The more the return on productive investment is externalized—or realized by 
entities other than those who finance the investment—and the more the return on rent seeking is 
internalized, the faster is rent seeking likely to grow as k falls.  In addition to the direct cost of rent 
seeking, there is an indirect cost, since rent seeking results in barriers to resource mobility behind which 
rents form, which is to say that future values of D and/or of ID will be higher, the higher is k today.  For 
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simplicity, the current values of D and of ID are assumed to reflect past rent seeking and thus to index 
the existing volume of rents.  Finally, Ps is a political system variable (to be defined more completely 
below) since the nature of its polity is likely to influence the nature and efficiency of an economy. 
As long as k is not too high, the diversion of resources into rent-seeking may be small, but for 
values of k above some critical level—which depends on the nature of the technologies in use, as well as 
on existing barriers to resource mobility—the effect on E can be strong.  A unit increase in k lowers yk 
directly and also by lowering E.  But the fall in E then lowers yk again, which gives rise to more rent 
seeking and could set off a downward spiral, whose strength depends on how fast yk falls vs. the rate of 
decrease in the return to rent seeking.  (On the interaction between productive investment and rent 
seeking, see Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny [1993].) 
Suppose initially that Ek is small enough to ignore. Then (5) implies that k
g
 = y
g
 – (yk)
g
, where 
yk)
g
 is the rate of change of the marginal product of capital over time.  Substituting this into (3) gives:  
y
g
 = [(E
g
 + A
g
)/(1yk)
g.                                                         (6). 
An increase in TFP raises the marginal product of capital at any given capital-to-labor ratio, increasing 
the value of k that is compatible with any given marginal product of capital, in this sense creating new 
opportunities for extensive growth and helping to stave off increases in rent seeking.  This is the 
complementarity between extensive and intensive growth referred to above.  Since  is about two thirds, 
a 2% increase in A, with constant E, will raise the value of k compatible with a given yk by 6%.   
More generally, (6) becomes y
g
 = A
g
/(1 when E and yk remain constant.  If free movement of 
financial capital internationally equates the marginal product of capital in different countries, or if for 
any other reason, k adjusts to maintain a given yk, both k and y will increase by no less than 6% per year, 
with two-thirds of this growth coming from capital deepening, rather than increases in TFP.  This is one 
reason why all nations that have achieved MEG have dramatically raised their capital-to-labor ratios.  It 
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is also why equation (1) and the parameter values used by Parente and Prescott imply higher levels of 
long-term growth than are generally observed.  The net effect of the increase in EA plus the capital 
deepening that it induces is to leave K/Y and (dK)/Y (or the investment share of Y) constant.  
Even though the greater part of the growth of y may be extensive, in the form of capital 
deepening, the intensive part is crucial.  If an economy is unable to generate any intensive growth, its 
growth will eventually die out, owing to an inability to increase some inputs and consequent diminishing 
returns to those inputs that can be increased, notably capital.  This is without taking rent seeking into 
account.  Purely extensive growth is possible in a highly-controlled, state-managed economy, notably 
the Soviet-type economy (hereafter, STE).  The controls in question may even speed up growth for a 
time, since they can be useful for generating high rates of saving and capital formation (although usually 
not for efficient investment of this capital) and for channeling resources into areas targeted for growth.   
Growth of Y that is purely extensive occurs mainly because of a rising capital-to-labor ratio—the 
result of high rates of forced saving and investment—and, for a time, rising labor force participation, 
falling unemployment, and migration of labor from agriculture to industry.  Eventually, however, it 
becomes difficult to expand labor input further or to re-allocate labor to more productive work.  Then 
the expansion of capital will cause the marginal product of capital to fall, a phenomenon documented in 
the former Soviet Union by Weitzman [1970] as early as the 1960s.  In the Soviet Union, the capital-to-
labor ratio soared over time, while the return on investment imitated Niagara Falls [Easterly and Fischer 
1995].  According to one estimate, Soviet economic growth of GNP per capita fell from 3.6% per year 
over 1960-1970 to .4% over 1986-1990 [Ofer 2004].  Total factor productivity growth became negative 
during the 1970s [Ofer 2004] and remained that way until the country’s demise at the end of 1991.   
With purely extensive growth, suppose that domestic financial flows are insulated from world 
markets—which was true of the Soviet economy—and that the supply of savings available for domestic 
 11 
 
investment comes entirely from domestic sources and is given by S = sY = dK, where s is a constant 
propensity to save.  When E
g
 + A
g
 = 0, (4) becomes y
g
 = (sEA/k(1))  Ng]= (syk  N
g
), where N
g
 is 
the growth rate of the labor force.  Thus y
g
 is decreasing in k, even without taking rent seeking into 
account.  To maintain a constant rate of growth as k increases would require an ever higher share of Y to 
be devoted to saving and investment, while opening domestic financial markets would most likely 
reduce growth by causing an outflow of domestic savings seeking higher returns abroad.  If the elasticity 
of substitution between capital and labor is below one, as Weitzman—and later Easterly and Fischer—
believed to be true of the Soviet economy, the retardation of growth will be even sharper as k rises, since 
the greater difficulty of substituting capital for labor will cause yk to fall more rapidly.  Easterly and 
Fischer estimate an elasticity of substitution of only .37, although their method of estimation has been 
criticized [Beare 2008]. 
Sooner or later, technological progress becomes necessary to keep down the consumption cost of 
extensive growth.  However, the STE crushed domestic innovation because of the shortage/monopoly 
nature of the system, as well as its over-centralization (or bureaucratization) and the "soft" budget 
constraint [Kornai 1980].  Over time, it also became less able to absorb technology imported from 
developed Western nations, in the sense of making productive use of this technology within the STE 
framework.  This caused the return on investment to fall to near zero and led to rising technological 
backwardness vis-à-vis the West outside the high-priority space and defense-related industries.   
The failure to generate intensive growth led to stagnation for most STEs by the mid-1980s.  
Stagnation with falling TFP was possible because, as noted above, destructive rent seeking tended to rise 
as yk fell.  More specifically, falling profitability of state enterprises plus their financial indiscipline 
within the STE (the soft budget constraint) caused growing budget deficits, in the broad sense of the 
government's borrowing requirement.  These deficits were mostly monetized, which generated repressed 
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inflation in the form of growing shortages at official prices, owing to price controls.  Thus these systems 
became more and more dysfunctional [Aslund 2002; Carson 1997, ch. 6; Goldman 1991].  Because of 
the rising gaps between official and demand prices, the "second" or "shadow" economies of these 
nations expanded by sucking resources out of the official or "first" economies. 
The rising differences between official and demand prices were a direct consequence of falling 
investment returns, which increased the budget deficit, since taxes depended on profitability of state 
firms.  These differences also caused rent seeking to rise, because control over scarce products and 
resources obtained at official prices yielded greater rent, often taken as gifts and bribes.
2
  More resources 
went not only into gaining control over supply, but also into obtaining goods and services for own use 
via queuing, searching, and waiting. 
The problem of stagnating growth in the STEs found no solution within the basic framework of 
state planning and management, requiring instead that this be replaced by a market economy, together 
with its supporting institutions and legal foundations.  This led to the upheaval of economic transition 
for nearly one third of the world's population.  The STEs left a legacy of widespread inefficiency for the 
successor transition economies, and, in most cases, considerable resistance to the necessary market-
oriented reforms by those whose rents were threatened [Aslund 2002].  Success in transition therefore 
turned mainly on the ability of an economy to generate new and efficient greenfield investment, in the 
form of new enterprises, rather than on its ability to transform the former state sector into efficient 
market-oriented producers [McMillan and Woodruff 2002], a task that proved to be Herculean.  China 
and Vietnam were especially successful in generating greenfield investment. 
In eastern and central Europe, rent seeking continued into transition and became the major 
enemy of market-oriented reforms [Aslund 2002].  The perpetuation of rent seeking, asset stripping, and 
of subsidies and controls that tied up capital in state or former state enterprises and prevented it from 
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becoming available to new firms with growth potential was brought about by the former Communist 
Party or nomenklatura elite, who relied on their insider contacts and knowledge.  Thus success in 
transition required the emergence of a new elite capable of challenging the former nomenklatura for 
political and economic power, and therefore a political transformation from dictatorship to democracy 
[Aslund 2002], which was more successful in some countries than in others.  (See Popov [2000].)  In 
China, the launching of successful economic reforms depended on the emergence of new leadership 
within the Communist Party after the death of Mao. 
There are limits as well to intensive growth of type (b), since ―catch-up‖ growth must die out as 
the efficiency coefficient, E, approaches one, or as the economy catches up to technologically advanced 
nations.  But because of rent seeking and of the way type (b) growth is sometimes implemented, it may 
also die out with E below one and falling.  Such growth benefits from a market economy with 
orientation of production to demand.  Otherwise it is hard to ensure that the right technologies will be 
imported and that the domestic economy will be able to absorb and integrate them in such a way as to 
expand production in a cost-effective manner.  But rapid growth is still possible with a multitude of 
subsidies and controls, including barriers to entry and exit of firms, restrictions on resource mobility, 
tightly-regulated capital markets, and soft budget constraints for some firms, notably banks and other 
financial institutions.  These controls are used to channel resources into technology acquisition and into 
sectors believed to have growth potential, using the technologies to be imported.  In addition, the 
technology-importing country may promote information and technology sharing between firms in order 
to disseminate technology more rapidly, albeit at the cost of discouraging innovation, since a firm 
subject to such promotion finds it harder to keep technological secrets from its sharing partners.  As part 
of this promotion, the process of learning to use new technologies and to make and market products 
based on them is likely to be subsidized. 
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The result is an effort to ―govern‖ the market [Wade 2004], rather than to replace it.  It is also a 
strategy of import substitution, or of restricting imports of designated products and replacing these with 
domestic production.  If this strategy is successful, it will also be a strategy of changing the nation’s 
comparative advantage toward higher value-added products whose exports are promoted, since—by the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem—it will otherwise end up forever protecting or subsidizing inefficient 
production.  Thus it is both a strategy of import substitution and one of export promotion, as well as a 
policy of dirigisme, in the sense of promoting growth in specific sectors of the economy.  In East Asia, 
the basic evolution was away from labor-intensive toward physical-capital-intensive and then 
knowledge-intensive (or human-capital-intensive) production.   
Restrictions, subsidies, and controls were needed because such a strategy meant specializing 
against current comparative or cost advantage.  By raising AD much more rapidly than A was rising, 
these interventions probably increased growth for a time, both in Western Europe after World War II 
and later in non-socialist East Asia [Eichengreen 2007; Wade 2004].
3
  But the restrictions, subsidies, and 
controls also increased D and created new rents, which had a long-term depressing effect on E. 
 
6B6BThe Policy Dilemma in Sustaining Growth 
 
This brings us to a major policy dilemma in sustaining growth.  As indicated, controls and subsidies 
can sometimes be used to temporarily speed up extensive growth or intensive growth based on imports of 
technology already in use abroad.  The required technologies are known commodities with known 
requirements for effective utilization, and such growth can therefore be implemented with forced saving and 
channeling of resources brought about via controls, subsidies, and quotas.  This ability to speed up growth is 
attractive to politicians and government officials when the latter are judged on short-term performance.  
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Once installed, however, the controls and subsidies have a tendency to persist because they 
create ―vulnerable rents‖ or rents that would disappear with their removal.  Such rents accrue behind any 
effective barrier to resource mobility.  They go to inputs in protected and subsidized firms and often as 
well to government officials involved in making and carrying out the dirigiste policies.  Political 
entrepreneurs representing the owners of these inputs (such as trade and professional unions) are likely 
to devise ways of collecting portions of these rents, which they then invest in political influence—using 
lobbying and contributions or bribes to politicians and public officials—designed to perpetuate the rents 
in question [Olson 1965].   
A government might try to protect in advance against perpetuation of these rents by including 
sunset provisions that automatically bring the subsidies and controls to an end once certain criteria have 
been met or a specified time period has elapsed.  But such provisions may also galvanize political 
entrepreneurs representing recipients of the vulnerable rents into action and could make the 
subsidies/controls even harder to get rid of.  This is part of the reason why governments find it hard to 
make credible long-term commitments. 
By the time the industries being promoted catch up technologically with the most advanced 
nations, the economic usefulness of promoting them further vanishes.  AD/A is now growing more 
slowly if at all, and the government is left with subsidies/controls that are detrimental to efficiency—or 
which depress E because of the direct and indirect costs of rent seeking—but which are politically 
difficult to remove.  It is possible to achieve both extensive growth and growth based on imported 
technology already in use abroad without subsidies, restrictions, and controls, but often only at a slower 
pace [Wade 2004], since there will be less mobilizing of savings, less channeling of technology and 
resources into growth industries, and possibly lower rates of physical and human capital formation. 
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In generating type (c) growth, moreover, dirigiste policies are likely to do more harm than good.   
We must ask how a government can know which specific industries, technologies, and production 
methods to promote or which specific types of human and physical capital to accumulate.  Without 
observable past experience as guide, the knowledge necessary to determine a best future direction of 
growth either does not yet exist or else is scattered among various economic agents—producers, 
consumers, researchers, etc.—and often remains tacit.  An advantage of markets originally noted by 
Hayek [1945] is that they can work efficiently without requiring this information to be centralized, 
which it is virtually impossible to do.  Thus a government can only know the best direction to take by 
observing and evaluating the past experiences of other nations and, possibly, its own past experience. 
Lacking these observations, uncertainty about the best future direction of growth becomes 
paramount.  No central authority can say with assurance which technologies will blossom in the future 
and what the resulting growth industries will be or which specific types of human and physical capital 
they will require. Thus targets, controls, and subsidies designed to promote specific ―growth‖ industries 
are likely to become counter-productive.  The same instruments that increased growth of type (a) and (b) 
become fetters to growth of type (c).  If one were designing policies to maximize long-term growth, one 
would choose fewer sector-specific interventions than in maximizing short-term growth.  Because they 
increase rent seeking, create barriers to resource mobility (plus excess capacity in oft-chosen priority 
sectors such as autos), and discourage innovation by promoting information and technology sharing, 
these interventions may fail to raise E over the long term.  In the short term, they may raise AD rapidly, 
but they also increase D, and after the benefits of the former are realized, the costs of the latter persist.    
Several countries in non-socialist East Asia are examples of growth in which government played 
a leading role—in facilitating technology imports, in channeling resources into targeted growth sectors, 
in disseminating technologies to domestic producers, and in assisting the process of learning to use these 
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technologies efficiently.  These nations sought export-led expansion, building efficient export sectors in 
the process.  For three decades and more, they achieved an "East Asian economic miracle".  
Basically, the East Asian model was a package of components, beginning with technology 
acquisition and absorption, but also including large public investments in infrastructure and in technical 
education, together with some targeting of sectors whose growth was to be promoted.  These industries 
were subsidized and protected, and large amounts of both private and public capital were invested in 
them.  This required controls on financial markets in order to channel loans to favored borrowers, as 
well as mainly non-tariff barriers to imports, which were often tightly controlled.  In this way, the 
countries in question built up their physical and human capital and shifted their comparative advantage 
toward higher value-added products.  In retrospect, they also benefited from the cold war, which made 
Western nations (especially the U.S.) willing to allow them access to technology at low cost, as well as 
to their domestic markets, without requiring reciprocity.   
These nations mobilized their resources to take advantage of the resulting opportunities, but the 
economic systems they built also contained serious weaknesses which came to light during or prior to 
the "Asian" crisis of 1997 [Krugman 1994; IMF Staff 1998].  (However, for an alternate view, see Wade 
[2004], esp. pp. xiii-liv).  Moreover, their growth came largely from capital deepening and increases in 
labor force participation, rather than from TFP increases [Young 1994].  TFP increases were 
respectable, but not out of line with many slower-growing nations.  The Asian NICs did more 
successfully exploit the gains from capital deepening that TFP increases made possible, although 
physical capital investment to GDP ratios also rose rapidly in some of them, notably in South Korea and 
Singapore [Young 1994]. 
Economic subsidies and controls benefited not only efficient export firms, but also many 
inefficient companies, both small and large, which supplied mainly the domestic market.  In this way, 
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prosperity was spread to inefficient sectors, but at the cost of preserving inefficiency in these sectors and 
of tying up capital in them.  In this way, AD peaked short of A, and AD could even begin to fall afterward 
if restrictions and subsidies caused inefficient sectors to become more laggard relative to best practices 
elsewhere.  Sectors benefitting from protection or subsidies resisted reform, in order to protect their 
vulnerable rents, and budget constraints were often soft for large banks and firms.  Promotion of 
information sharing between firms lowered the cost and speeded up the process of learning about how to 
use existing technologies productively, but also tended to discourage innovation since it raised the cost 
of keeping a company’s activities secret.  In short, dirigiste policies left a legacy of rents whose 
preservation depended on maintaining barriers and disincentives to innovation and entrepreneurship, as 
well as to resource mobility, and interfered with rational investment choices. 
Here Japan is a leading example.  For many years, the Japan provided the growth model for 
much of East Asia, and economic gurus calculated how long it would take Japan to overtake the United 
States in per-capita GDP.  Japan's growth "miracle" appeared to be living proof that government 
intervention in the form of industrial policy could increase the pace of economic growth.  More recently, 
Japan has been viewed as an example of a stagnant economy in which resources are tied up in inefficient 
sectors.  The growth of real GDP per capita, measured in purchasing power parities of 2005, averaged 
8.2% over 1960-1973, but just 1.2% over 1990-2007 [U.S. Department of Labor 2008].  Relative to the 
U.S., Japanese GDP/capita peaked in 1991.  In Taiwan, the period of fastest growth of real per capita 
GDP, according to official figures (in 2001 prices), was over 1975-1990, at 7.4%, falling to 3.5% over 
2000-2007.  Growth also slowed in Singapore and in South Korea, although by lesser amounts. 
Having well-developed financial markets and freedom from market and trade distortions becomes 
crucial in generating type (c) growth since these are favorable to innovation and to reaching and maintaining a 
relatively high value of E.  Because dirigiste policies no longer raise long-term growth, often the best a 
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government can do is to establish a favorable climate for investment and competition, with strong protection of 
property rights.  Good corporate governance—especially protection of minority owners against expropriation by 
majority owners and other company insiders—also appears to be of crucial.  The result is far from being a 
prescription for laissez-faire, since lack of oversight can also stimulate rent seeking and lower E by reducing the 
quality and raising the cost of information about complex financial products, thereby raising ID.  Perhaps 
ironically, Government regulation has a major role to play in maintaining competition and resource mobility, in 
protecting property rights, in combating fraud and other types of manipulation, and in ensuring transparency, 
with the ultimate goal of tying rents to productivity.  Indeed government’s regulatory role is likely to become 
more difficult and complicated—as markets grow more complex and sophisticated—but even more necessary 
and important than before. 
 
7B7BThe Role of Democracy 
―…democracies per se are not conducive to improved institutions; democratic longevity, however, is.‖ 
 
                                                                                                                      Calderon and Chong, 2006 
  
 
The relationship of democracy to economic growth has been contentious.  Many studies suggest 
either that democracy has no effect on growth vis-à-vis autocracy or dictatorship or that democracy 
actually reduces growth.  (A partial list of these studies is given in Gerring, Bond, Barndt, and Moreno 
[2005] on p. 1n.)  A well-known article by Barro [1996] argues that an increase in democracy raises 
economic growth when the level of political freedom is low, but reduces growth when the level of 
freedom is already moderate or high.  
However, more recent studies give more optimistic assessments of this relationship.  (See, for 
example, Shen [2002], Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein [2005], Gerring, Bond, Barndt, and Moreno 
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[2005], and Rodrik and Wacziarg [2005].)  In particular, Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein argue that 
democracy is favorable to economic development even for nations that are initially poor.  And Gerring, 
Bond, Barndt, and Moreno (hereafter GBBM) argue that the accumulation of what might be called 
"democratic capital" unambiguously increases growth.  That is, the longer a country has been 
democratic and the more democratic it has been during this time, the higher is likely to be its subsequent 
long-term growth—an argument that they buttress with strong empirical evidence.  Experience allows 
democratic institutions to develop and improve, along with the skills needed to operate these efficiently.   
GBBM use data from the Polity IV project, which each year assigns a ―polity score‖ between 
10 and +10, reflecting the extent of democracy or autocracy, to each nation of the world with a 
population of over 500,000.  As indicated, GBBM take into account not only a nation’s current polity 
score, but also past scores as indicators of regime history and indices of how much democratic capital 
has been accumulated.  In this way, their study differs from previous efforts to relate economic growth 
to type of government.  Recent Polity IV data are online at HHUUwww.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm UUHH.  
The political system variable, Ps, in the right-hand side of (4) is an index of this democratic capital.  For 
any given economy, it therefore depends on that nation’s past and present polity scores. 
In the final analysis, the advantage of democracy is that accumulating democratic capital is 
favorable to relatively high and stable values of E.  Increases in Ps either bring about or are analogous to 
decreases in D/ and in ID/I and to increases in AD/A.  Thus E is increasing in Ps, and higher Ps values 
also imply values of the other arguments of E that are favorable to keeping E relatively high.  This 
contributes to long-term growth by keeping the marginal product of capital relatively high at any given 
capital-to-labor ratio, k.  One reason for high E values is that democracy tends to be a prerequisite for 
well defined, enforced, and transparent property rights and for the rule of law, meaning in particular that 
government itself is subordinate to the law and therefore constrained in making arbitrary changes in 
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property rights.  Democracies also limit the ability of an incumbent government to accumulate power, 
since these limits, if applied fairly to all, help to preserve political party competition.  And democracy is 
associated with greater freedom to innovate and to compete on domestic markets, as well as less control 
over and less compartmentalization of information and freer movement of physical and intellectual 
capital, which is to say relatively high values of AD/A and relatively low values of D/ and ID/I.
4
 
There are three further reasons why accumulating democratic capital is increases E.
5
  First, 
democracy favors protection of human rights and civil liberties and therefore the accumulation and 
efficient use of human capital [Wintrobe 2004].  Second, the greater a country's stock of democratic 
capital, the greater its stock of what might be termed ―social‖ capital is likely to be as well.  Finally, the 
accumulation of democratic capital has a negative effect on destructive rent seeking.  This is a direct 
result of the greater inclusiveness of democratic polities; the demands of a larger percentage of citizens 
count in determining supplies of public goods and in influencing government decisions more generally.  
In fact, democracies supply public consumption goods at far higher levels than do dictatorships, which 
often substitute club goods available mainly to the ruler and his political elite.  Provision of public 
consumption goods is also income elastic in democracies, but not in dictatorships [Deacon 2003]. 
We consider these three in turn.  First Wintrobe [2004] argues that protection of inalienable 
human rights—including habeas corpus plus the right to a free and fair trial and to impartial resolution 
of disputes—is important purely on grounds of economic efficiency.  He notes (p. 85) that "Economic 
efficiency justifies the ownership of private property on the ground that property should be allocated to 
the party who is most highly motivated to maximize its value.  Who is it that can be counted on to 
manage or take care of a piece of property best?  The owner.  Human rights give this privilege of 
'ownership' of the individual (if you like, of his labour and human capital) to the individual himself or 
herself."  In authoritarian regimes, by contrast, ownership of human capital rests ultimately with the 
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dictator, whose interest lies in preserving and increasing his own power and wealth.  One manifestation 
of this is shorter life spans under dictatorship than under democracy [Przeworski et. al. 2000].  The 
ability to make better use of human capital is analogous to a decrease in D/ and an increase in AD/A.  
This is also a consequence of the more inclusive nature of democracies, since basic human rights are 
public goods. 
Second, "social capital" refers to the capacity for mutual trust and to the capacity for co-
operation based on this trust [Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004].  In some societies, trust and co-
operation are restricted largely to family units and/or religious sects, ethnic or racial groups, villages or 
neighborhoods, and other similar communities that produce well-defined common bonds.  Such limited 
trust may be favorable to economic growth in some cases, but could also lead to monopoly, theft, and 
even violence between the groups in question.  It is often not good for the economy as a whole.  One 
accumulates trust by foregoing opportunities to behave opportunistically toward others.  Over the long 
term, someone with a reputation for not taking advantage of others may accumulate IOUs, which can 
eventually be cashed in.  However, the incentive to build a reputation for trustworthiness and honest 
dealing depends on the expectation of reciprocity.  This is why mutual trust may be confined to 
members of a family or narrowly-defined community with strong group ties.  
Yet, trust across groups, or ―generalized trust,‖ plays a key role in economic development.  It is 
the capacity for this kind of trust that we have in mind when speaking of "social capital."  Together with 
the rule of law, generalized trust makes possible complex and extensive forms of specialization and 
cooperation in production and exchange, including large and sophisticated financial markets.  Virtually 
any type of exchange in which one party receives a promise of future payment in return for a tangible 
benefit delivered now is facilitated by trust, and the more widespread the trust, the greater the 
possibilities for exchanges of this nature.  Conversely, the more limited the trust, the greater the limits 
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on such exchanges, which are also limits on opportunities for productive investment and therefore to the 
movement of capital into higher-value uses.  A greater capacity for generalized trust is analogous to a 
reduction in D/ and an increase in AD/A. 
Democratic governments have a stronger incentive to foster the development of generalized trust 
and to be tolerant of conditions that favor the development of social capital than do authoritarian 
regimes.  A key feature of the current government in most democracies is an expectation of future loss 
of political power, followed by subsequent opportunities to regain that power.  Loss of power is not 
permanent, because leading parties or coalitions alternate in forming the government, depending on 
electoral success.  They may also share control of government at any point in time.  By contrast, once a 
dictatorial regime loses power, its chances of returning are usually low, and former leaders may face 
death, imprisonment, exile, or other punishment.  Dictatorships can also base themselves on relatively 
narrow elites, whereas political success in democracy requires the support of broadly-based coalitions in 
order to gain enough votes to take power—the basic reason why democratic polities are more inclusive 
than dictatorships, although other factors are also involved—see Carson [2007, p. 15]. 
In this context, generalized trust makes it easier for different groups to co-operate in political as 
well as in economic life and, in particular, to co-operate in efforts to replace a current government.  An 
authoritarian regime can only lose from the latter co-operation, whereas a political party in a democracy 
may gain by using it as part of the coalition that sustains it in the ongoing electoral competition for 
power.  A party out of power needs such a coalition to get (back) in, and parties must be able to rebuild 
their coalitions from time to time.  Thus a dictatorship will usually view the building of trust or social 
capital outside its control as a potential threat, whereas a democratic government or its opposition may 
just as well see this as giving it a potential advantage. 
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In addition, political party competition for votes gives citizens more power vis-a-vis government.  
Inalienable human rights, as well as the rule of law, are therefore more likely to exist in democracies; 
again this relates to the more inclusive nature of democracy since these are basic public goods.  A key 
result is better use and allocation of human capital and also expansion of the time horizons of economic 
decision-makers.  In turn, the latter is favorable to the building of trust and co-operation.  Under 
dictatorship, rights tend to be granted and revoked at the pleasure of the ruling elite and are therefore 
alienable.  The political risk that existing rights will be taken away always has to be factored into 
decisions related to investment and finance. 
Finally, the accumulation of democratic capital has a negative effect on destructive rent seeking.  
A detailed argument is given in Carson [2007], but the basic reason is that rent seeking can provide a 
higher benefit at a lower cost to a dictator than it can to a strong democratic government.  Inclusiveness 
is the enemy of destructive rent seeking because it gives a political voice to those who would bear its 
costs and raises their access to information (or reduces ID).  Empirically, voting appears to be efficient in 
rewarding or punishing politicians according to their performance in office, possibly mainly because 
swing voters are well informed [Peltzman 1990; Silva and da Silva Costa 2006].     
By contrast, a dictator can rely mainly on the support of a relatively small elite base, whose 
members are paid directly with access to rents [Wintrobe 2004].  (An example of such a base would be 
the nomenklatura elite in nations ruled by communist parties.)  A dictator needs a support base because 
he faces potential threats to his wealth and power and must therefore command the loyalty of an elite on 
whom he can rely for political support.  Eliminating electoral competition does not eliminate 
competition for power, but rather shifts this to arenas where a much smaller percentage of the population 
determines who will rule.  The result is a less inclusive society.  Citizens will have less influence over 
policy than under democracy since their votes do not count in choosing the government.  A dictator can 
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use rents to buy the support of his elite base and shift the cost of this onto citizens without a political 
voice, a practice that grows harder as a polity becomes more inclusive. 
Under dictatorship, there is no free press, and secrecy in government is paramount—conditions 
that are ideal for destructive rent seeking.  Individuals within the political elite have a correspondingly 
high degree of freedom to seek rent, and their rent seeking is likely to be subsidized.  This is because 
members of the dictator’s elite base also pose a threat to him; when dictators are overthrown, it is 
usually by government insiders [Svolik 2009].  One way to reduce this threat is to allow and even 
encourage elements of this base to compete with one another for rents, thereby diverting their attention 
and interest from efforts to overthrow the dictator, while also impeding their ability to build the kind of 
trust that would be necessary if they are to co-operate in his overthrow.  In addition, the dictator’s elite 
base is likely to be heavily involved with the inefficient enterprises that often result when policy is 
designed to favor growth of type (a) or (b) above, making the reforms needed to achieve type (c) growth 
more difficult to institute than under democracy. 
 
8B8BConclusion 
 
The policy dilemma in generating growth that can be sustained over the long term is the 
perceived desirability of instituting sector-specific subsidies and controls to speed up growth that is 
extensive and/or based on imported technology that is already in use abroad.  The government is then 
left with subsidies/controls that are detrimental to efficiency—or which depress E because of the direct 
and indirect effects of rent seeking—but which are politically difficult to remove.  The resulting legacy 
becomes a fetter to growth as growth has increasingly to be based on domestic innovation and sharing of 
new technology developed abroad.  In the final analysis, accumulating democratic capital is the best and 
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most basic way to reduce this legacy, thereby ensuring economic growth that will sustain itself.  
Democracies are a long way from being perfect, but when we are disappointed with the results of 
democracy, it sometimes helps to remember Churchill’s remark that ―Democracy is the worst form of 
government—except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.‖6 
 
3B3BNotes 
 
1. More general discussions of the factors favorable to economic growth can be found in 
Mankiw [1995], Barro [1996], Howitt [2004], Gerring, Bond, Barndt, and Moreno [2005], 
Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein [2005], and in sources cited by these authors.                             
2.  In addition, setting outputs at their bribe-maximizing levels may have undermined central 
     planning to a degree.  See Shleifer and Vishny [1992]. 
            3.  Regarding Europe, see Foreman-Peck and Frederico [1999] and Eichengreen [2007].           
4.  Dictators can tap directly into monopoly profits and use a monopoly as a repository of jobs  
     for supporters and relatives.  They can also more easily control production in an industry that  
     is monopolized or cartelized.  A democratic government is more constrained in using a  
     monopoly in this way, and monopoly is therefore less appealing to it in light of the costs that  
     monopoly imposes on its customers. 
5.  Additional reasons and discussion are given in Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein. 
 
6.  From a speech in the British House of Commons, Nov. 11, 1947. 
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